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Abstract
Any cooperation that pro¯ts from relation-speci¯c investments suf-
fers from the well-known hold-up problem. If investments are not
enforceable by an outside authority, the gains fall prey to individual
opportunism caused by a free-rider problem. If, in addition, individ-
ual investments exhibit positive cross e®ects, Che and Hausch (1999)
provide a negative result and show that contracts cannot overcome the
hold up due to a lack of veri¯able commitment. This paper develops a
mechanism that provides such a commitment device: (1) It introduces
an acknowledgement game that procures reliable. (2) It embeds the
original contracting problem into two institutional designs { a market
based one and a private design { that support enforcement. These
two devices reestablish e±cient investments as enforceable results of
a contract.
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11 Introduction
The need for relation-speci¯c investments is known as a source of ine±ciency
for all kinds of collaborations. It causes collaborators to choose lower-than-
optimal investment levels which may prevent potentially bene¯cial collabo-
rations. Accordingly, the question of how to overcome these impediments
has been addressed in a huge literature.
It has started out from Goldberg (1976), Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson
(1975, chapter 2)) who have addressed this main source of ine±ciency as
the hold-up problem. A solution to this problem is especially hard to ¯nd if
parties are unable to write contracts that can be enforced by a court, because,
for instance, investment levels are unveri¯able for third parties. This missing
enforcement makes any contract `incomplete'.1
The literature on incomplete contracts has provided di®erent solutions to the
underinvestment problem. If physical assets are essential to production, a
speci¯c assignment of property rights helps to correct investment incentives
(Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore (1990)). If individual invest-
ments can be done sequentially, use of the timing structure can produce the
desired result (De Fraja (1999); Che (2000)).
An alternative approach that can be applied to problems where the invest-
ment does not produce physical assets has used rede¯ned contracts. Seminal
work in this branch has been Hart and Moore's (1988) paper that shows that
sophisticated contracts can overcome the hold up and induce ¯rst-best invest-
ments if the parties to the contract can commit not to start renegotiations
in case of an adverse outcome.2 This latter condition has been challenged
in a number of papers that aim at developing self-enforcing contracts to cir-
1Incompleteness has a number of other sources than those addressed here. Hart and
Moore (1988, 1999), Tirole (1999), Segal (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), and Maskin
(2002) have discussed incomplete contracts from di®erent perspectives. We will, however,
restrict our attention to non-veri¯ability of investments.
2Yet, Jolls (1997) and Shavell (2007) argue that prevailing legal practice destroys such
a commitment.
2cumvent or preclude renegotiations. This issue has been addressed in, for
instance, Aghion et al. (1994), NÄ oldeke and Schmidt (1995), Hermalin and
Katz (1993), and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996). In addition, recent work has
shown that the question if renegotiations are harmful or bene¯cial depends
on a number of details of the contracting problem at hand like completeness
vs. incompleteness (see Schmitz (2005)) and the magnitude of complexity of
the contract (see Schwartz and Watson (2004)).
An { at least from a theoretical perspective { \¯nal" word came from Maskin
and Moore (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999). The former have shown that
any social choice rule can be implemented (which includes e±ciency) if the
original contract can be augmented by an additional mechanism. The latter
have established a negative result that proves that no contract can implement
¯rst-best investments as long as it is impossible to exclude renegotiations and
partners' relation-speci¯c investments exhibit externalities (which they label
as \cross e®ects"). Thus, they conclude that contracting { a usually time-
consuming and expensive activity { is not useful at all.
This paper starts out from Che and Hausch's and Maskin and Moore's analy-
ses of contracts and aims at establishing a link between the extremely positive
and the extremely negative view that can be taken from these two papers.
Empirical evidence shows that ¯rms establish collaborations and use con-
tracts (for reference Narula and Hagedoorn (1999), Hagedoorn (2002) and
Reuer, Arino and Mellewigt (2006)) and { as we might add { probably not
all of these activities are ine±cient and vain. Thus, we ask if there can be
conditions named that are favourable for getting contracts \work".
We model a situation where two parties want to start a joint project that
needs relation-speci¯c investments. In that we might think of a project to
develop a new software, where both partners have to contribute to the pro-
gramme code, or of a research joint venture between two ¯rms that cannot
be integrated { for instance, because they are physically distant, maybe even
across di®erent countries. Both scenarios have in common that a property-
rights approach cannot be used. Investments are relation speci¯c as they
3have aspects that are more valuable for the joint product than anywhere else
and they are not enforceable by a third party. For the software example this
non-enforceability results from the fact that it is hard to assess the value
of a software unless it is accomplished. For the joint research project en-
forceability can either be curtailed because partners are located in di®erent
jurisdictions { leading to uncertainty as to which rules apply { or simply
because of features that are unobservable for outsiders. In addition, we as-
sume that individual investments exhibit mutual positive externalities. Here,
one might think of modules of a software that work better if ¯tted to each
other or, for the research joint venture, of investments in infrastructure or
corporate culture that support knowledge spillovers.
Thus, our basic scenario has the structure of Che and Hausch's (1999) model
which implies that ¯rst-best investments cannot be supported by contracts
between both partners as long as renegotiations cannot be excluded. We
augment the original contract by an additional mechanism in the style of
Maskin and Moore (1999) that aims at a self-enforcing defense against dis-
turbing renegotiations. In that, we introduce a so-called message game that
aims at turning unveri¯able information (the actual level of investments) into
veri¯able one (reports on the level of investment). This message game is part
of the contracting process. It consists of reports concerning own investment
activities and mutual acknowledgement of these activities. Such a process of
an ex-interim information exchange is a way to model the system of so-called
letters of intent which are widely used as part of the initiation of coopera-
tion in real-life contracting.3 By means of these letters parties to a contract
can cross-check each other's progress. Our model abstracts from the timing
aspect found within real-world contracting but describes the incentive e®ects
of this ex-interim communication.
We show that such an additional mechanism does not help to avoid ine±cien-
cies if there are no institutions that support parties in contract enforcement.
3For a short introduction into costs and bene¯ts of letters of intent from a more practical
point of view see, for instance, Homburger and Schueller (2002).
4We analyse the e®ects of such institutions. In that we concentrate on two
types:
In a ¯rst setting, we allow parties to introduce a third party that helps to
enforce the contract. Third-party payments have been shown to help enforce
contracts, so this is in principle no news.4 What distinguishes our setting
from other work is that the payment scheme is endogenous to the contract
and depends on the course of the collaboration. In a second setting, we allow
for costs that are due to a loss of reputation if it becomes known that the
partners had di±culties in implementing the agreed terms. Thus, in this
scenario the market o®ers the only corrective mechanism.
A comparative statics analyses which parameters allow for an implementation
of ¯rst-best investments. We show that the market is a good support only if
both partners are necessary for the project's success after investments have
been made and partners have to accept substantial reputation losses in case
of a break down of cooperations. In consequence, the market solution only
applies to a limited range of problems.
The solution including a third party leads to stable results independent of
outside conditions. Yet, the details of the contract with the outside party
have to be well chosen which renders the design of the optimal contract
complex.
Both settings share this latter property of contract complexity which makes
contracting expensive. As we will show, this feature is on the one hand
onerous but on the other hand useful as a commitment device.
2 Basic Model
We consider two players A and B that are symmetric, risk-neutral, rational,
and enter a joint activity (a software project or a research joint venture as
indicated above). The value of the joint product is R(®;¯) where ® denotes
4For instance, Hart and Moore (1988) (footnote 20), Che and Hausch (1999) (footnote
10), and Maskin and Moore (1999) hint at this possibility.
5A's nonnegative investment and ¯ that of B. We assume R(®;¯) to be twice
di®erentiable, increasing, and concave in investments.
In addition, investments are relation speci¯c and exhibit mutual positive
externalities on partner's productivity. That is, R(®;0) = R(0;¯) = 0,
@R
@®j(0;¯) À 0, @R
@¯j(®;0) À 0, and @2R
@®@¯ = @2R
@¯@® > 0. Investment costs are
private and linear cA = ®, cB = ¯. We assume that partners know each other
su±ciently well such that properties of the production function are common
knowledge to both parties when starting the collaboration and designing a
contract.
Throughout the paper we assume that it is bene¯cial to cooperate, that is,
R(®;¯) À ®+¯ for ® and ¯ below a certain threshold. The total pro¯t from
cooperation is ¼ = R¡®¡¯. Thus, e±cient investments are characterized by
@R
@® = @R
@¯ = 1. Throughout the paper we will denote these e±cient investment
levels by ®¤ and ¯¤.
Revenue from the ¯nal product will be split between both partners according
to an initially negotiated splitting rule (¸;1 ¡ ¸) where ¸ denotes A's share
of the revenue. For sake of simplicity we set ¸ = 1=2. Thus, as each party
has to bear its own investment costs to a full extent but receives only half
of its bene¯ts, a free-riding problem arises. Individually rational levels of
investment are characterized by @R
@® = @R
@¯ = 2. These investment levels are
denoted by ®sb and ¯sb. Due to concavity of the production function these
investment levels are lower than ¯rst-best levels.
Now, both ¯rms would like to design a contract that helps to overcome the
hold-up as well as the free-riding problem and implements ¯rst-best invest-
ments. Yet, we assume that investments are observable between partners but
cannot be veri¯ed by an outside party (we will discuss this assumption in
section 5). From Che and Hausch (1999) we know that in this situation both
paries will stick to second-best investments no matter how sophisticated the
contract has been as long as there is no means to curb renegotiations after
unfavorable outcomes.
In what follows we describe a mechanism that helps to overcome the prob-
6lems characterized by Che and Hausch (1999). In detail, we will construct
a mechanism that consists of two parts: First, parties implement an initial
contract that sports mutual subsidies to balance the underinvestment incen-
tives. Second, they enrich the contracting process by an additional stage
where parties exchange reports concerning their investments. These reports
transform the observable but unveri¯able information on investments into
veri¯able information. Yet, this transformation alone does not su±ce to
implement the ¯rst-best solution. In addition, we need to establish an en-
dogenous means to curb renegotiations. In that we compare two institutional
designs: The introduction of a third party and a market-based scheme of in-
formation transmission. Both scenarios have in common that contract breach
will be punished. In the third-party scheme the parties to the original con-
tract stipulate a damage payment for this event and ask a third party to
enforce this payment. In the market-based scheme no active third party is
involved; instead, the original contract is designed in a way that the con-
sequences of a contract breach will get public and both parties take into
account that they have to accept a loss of reputation from that.
We analyze equilibria of the contracting game within these two settings in the
°avor of Maskin and Moore's (1999) idea of an additional mechanism. As the
scenario under consideration is endogenous (parties can decide if they want
to hire an active third party), we add a comparative statics that discusses
costs and bene¯ts of both institutional frames.
3 Model Extension - a Message Game
In their original contract parties agree upon investment levels { which are
®¤ and ¯¤ { and on mutual subsidies that are supposed to balance the
underinvestment incentives. These subsidies amount to one half of each
partner's investment cost. Thus, for party A the overall pro¯t turns into
¼A(®;¯) = 1=2R(®;¯)¡®+1=2®¡1=2¯ (correspondingly for B). The cost
of an additional investment is now borne by both parties and ¯rst-best levels
7would be implemented under such a payo® scheme. Yet, as investments are
not veri¯able to an outside party, this payo® scheme is not enforceable: Each
party has an incentive to claim higher subsidies than would be appropriate
which cannot be proven as a false claim.
In order to transform this unveri¯able information into veri¯able one, we
introduce a so-called message game. It takes place when investments have
already been made and are common knowledge to both parties (but not to
outsiders). The message game itself has two stages. At stage one each party
reports on its investments. These reports are named ~ ® and ~ ¯. At stage two
parties have to authenticate each other's report. This additional mechanism
is shown in the left part of Figure 1 on page 11. The message game is played
in a \public" environment, either in front of a solicitor or by use of other
publishing devices that help to prevent cheating.
If both parties validate the other's report (labeled as strategy v), it is agreed
upon in the original contract that mutual subsidies are paid according to
these reports (instead of to the unveri¯able real investment levels). That is,
if parties have reported ~ ®; ~ ¯, true investments have been ®;¯ (which need
not necessarily to be the same values), and both parties have validated each
other's report, there will be a payment of 1=2~ ® from B to A and 1=2~ ¯ from
A to B. Thus, the initial contract leads to payo®s
¼A(®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;v;v) = 1=2R(®;¯) ¡ ® + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯;
¼B(®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;v;v) = 1=2R(®;¯) ¡ ¯ ¡ 1=2~ ® + 1=2~ ¯:
Within the original investment decision overinvestment is not to be expected.
Yet, there might be incentives for exaggerating own investment at the report-
ing stage. To avoid possibly misleading incentives only reports ~ ® · ®¤ and
~ ¯ · ¯¤ are accepted. If one of both parties sends a higher report, it is read
as ®¤ or ¯¤. In the same way we restrict the set of reports from below by
®sb and ¯sb where ®sb and ¯sb follow from the considerations on second-best
investment levels on page 6. Reports lower than these values are read as ®sb
and ¯sb.
8However, if one party rejects the other one's report { or even both parties do
so { cooperation is interfered and might even break down. For these cases,
the original contract has to allot mutual payments and a plan for further
proceedings. The details of these payments and proceedings depend on the
institutional frame of the contracting problem and are therefore given in the
subsections to follow.
Yet, the structure of the stipulated payments is the same for both cases and
is based on the following reasoning: If one of both players, say A, rejects (la-
beled as strategy r) whereas the other one (B) validates, the situation could
be read as \A has reported truthfully and B has tried to cheat". Therefore,
further cooperation would be restrained. For this case both parties agree on
a damage payment that should reimburse A for the loss of potential pro¯t
caused by B's misbehaviour.
This payment is constructed in the style of an expectation damage used in
contract law.5 The damage is based on reports ~ ® and ~ ¯ which is the only
available information concerning the size of the loss occurred. If ~ ® and ~ ¯
were the true investment levels, A's revenue under validation would have
been 1=2R(~ ®; ~ ¯)+1=2~ ®¡1=2~ ¯. B has to pay this amount to indemnify A.6
So far, the contract says that after unilateral rejection of a report cooperation
breaks down and the rejecting party receives a damage payment. Yet, with-
out any further precautions the contracting process will not stop here. By
abandoning the cooperation both parties have waived R(®;¯). They could
regain this value if they would enter renegotiations and split the revenue ac-
cording to their bargaining power { which we assume to be equal as parties
are symmetric. If parties account for this possibility, the damage payment
5An expectation damage is a default remedy for contract breach in contract law. The
expectation damage is supposed to put the truster in the position he would have enjoyed
had the contract been carried out. For a discussion see Shavell (2004).
6To put A in the position he would have been in if the contract had been ful¯lled, the
payment should actually include the surplus following from real investments R(®;¯). Yet,
as this information is not contractible, the use of R(~ ®; ~ ¯) is as close as we can get to the
original contract.
9and the renegotiation payo® following the break down induces them to over-
report and reject the other party's o®er to extract an excessive payment from
the partner.
To avoid this problem, an additional part of the original contract covers that
the rejecting party has to waive its part of the joint surplus of the project.
This precaution in its own right diminishes incentives to renegotiate.7 But
parties have to use an additional means to keep each other honoring the
original agreement. As a start the partner who paid the damage { in our
example B { continues the project on his own.8 Depending on the problem at
hand this can or cannot be possible without any restrictions: As investments
have already taken place, it only remains to produce the output based on the
joint production function. If both parties' inputs have been su±ciently close
(in a spatial or factual sense), the remaining party might have the capacity
to go on alone. However, if (as in the cross-country example) production
cannot be handled by one partner, there is a cost d to continue the project
alone. We assume that d can take values in [0;1) { depending on the project
under consideration { where large values imply a prohibitive cost. Now that
the rejecting party (in our example A) has waived its part of the surplus and
the other one controls the production process, di®erent scenarios could apply
that are outlined in Figure 1:
The ¯rst one { which we mentioned before as the \market-based scheme"
{ assumes that the contracting mechanism stops here. That is, B keeps
the whole revenue and receives R(®;¯) minus the continuation cost d and
possibly an additional reputation loss. This loss might arise because the
fact that B continues the project on his own gets public and possible future
partners see that B \snatched" A's part of the surplus. For the technical
part of the paper the value of this loss is assumed to be part of d. In sum,
payo®s after investments ®;¯, messages ~ ®; ~ ¯ and onesided rejection by player
7A similar procedure { albeit in a di®erent context { has been used by Brennan and
Watson (2002) and Ramey and Watson (2002).
8Lerner and Malmendier (2008) have analyzed the e®ect of reassigning property rights
within a contracting problem that includes cooperative as well as competitive aspects.
10Figure 1: The Contracting process
A take on the form
¼A(®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;r;v) = ¡® + 1=2R(~ ®; ~ ¯) + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯;
¼B(®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;r;v) = R(®;¯) ¡ d ¡ ¯ ¡ 1=2R(~ ®; ~ ¯) ¡ 1=2~ ® + 1=2~ ¯:
If A validates and B does not, payo®s are determined analogously.
The second scenario { which we have mentioned as the \third-party scheme"
{ assumes that due to the original contract B controls the production pro-
cess but that A's part of the revenue 1=2R(®;¯) { which is veri¯able after
production has taken place { gets transferred to the solicitor (or another me-
diating agent). Thus, in that scenario the game is enlarged by a third active
player. As we will see in the analysis section, the additional continuation
cost d do not add to the incentive structure under the third-party scheme.
Therefore, we will assume d = 0 throughout this scenario. Thus, payo®s
11after investments ®;¯, messages ~ ®; ~ ¯ and onesided rejection by player A take
on the form
¼A(®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;r;v) = ¡® + 1=2R(~ ®; ~ ¯) + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯;
¼B(®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;r;v) = 1=2R(®;¯) ¡ ¯ ¡ 1=2R(~ ®; ~ ¯) ¡ 1=2~ ® + 1=2~ ¯:
The remaining 1=2R(®;¯) is part of the solicitor's payo®. If A validates and
B does not, payo®s are determined analogously.
In case both players choose non-validation, that is, they accuse each other of
misreporting, independent of the scenario under consideration no payments
are settled and cooperation breaks down, thus, ¼A(®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;r;r) = ¡®,
¼B(®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;r;r) = ¡¯.
Now we have stated the payo®s following from an initial contract that covers
all possible modes of behaviour under the third-party and the market-based
scheme. Yet, there might be incentives to renegotiate. Thus, before we
can enter a backward-induction analysis of the game to describe possible




In this setting we assume that parties have developed a contract that includes
a solicitor as an active party to the game. To start a backward-inductive anal-
ysis of the di®erent stages of the game, we have to determine ¯nal payo®s.
As follows from the description in section 3, the payo® matrix of the au-
thentication stage (that is, when real investments ®;¯ and messages ~ ®; ~ ¯ are
¯xed) in the third-party scheme takes the form shown in Table 1.
Here, \subsidy A" denotes the net subsidy A receives which equals 1=2~ ® ¡
1=2~ ¯ (correspondingly for B) and \damage to A" is the above-named pay-
12A=B v r
v
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® + subsidy A
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ + subsidy B
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ damage to B
¼B = ¡¯ + damage to B
r
¼A = ¡® + damage to A
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ ¡ damage to A
¼A = ¡®
¼B = ¡¯
Table 1: Authentication game under the third-party scheme before renegoti-
ations
ment 1=2R(~ ®; ~ ¯)+1=2~ ®¡1=2~ ¯ (again correspondingly for B). The payment
of 1=2R(®;¯) for the solicitor is not included in this payo® matrix.
To cover all strategic options, we have to check if parties want to enter
renegotiations. We assume that renegotiations are possible but costly where
c is the (lump sum) renegotiation cost to be borne by each party.9 An analysis
of all entries of the payo® matrix yields:
If both parties have validated each other's report, there is no room for rene-
gotiations as there is no additional rent to be shared. In contrast, if both
parties have rejected each other's report, they loose 1=2R(®;¯) each accord-
ing to the original contract. Thus, as long as c is small enough there might
be scope for renegotiations.10
As the original contract is not valid anymore once renegotiations have started,
the division of revenue will now be subject to bargaining. We assume that
parties have symmetric bargaining power. Following Rubinstein's (1982)
model of bargaining we assume that in equilibrium a split according to
9We have assumed that parties are risk neutral { thus, renegotiation costs are modelled
as a ¯xed payment. Maskin and Moore (1999) allow for risk averse parties. In that case
renegotiation costs can be covered by an uncertain outcome of the renegotiations { which
leads to a ¯xed payment under a risk-premium calculation.
10We actually assume that c < 1=2R(®sb;¯sb) as a regularity condition that is explained




¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® + subsidy A
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ + subsidy B
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ damage to B
¼B = ¡¯ + damage to B
r
¼A = ¡® + damage to A
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ ¡ damage to A
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ c
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ ¡ c
Table 2: Authentication game under third-party payments
the Nash-bargaining solution results: an equal division of the rent to be
shared. Thus, each party receives 1=2R(®;¯). In consequence, parties re-
ceive ¼RN
A (®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;r;r) = 1=2R(®;¯) ¡ ® ¡ c and ¼RN
B (®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯;r;r) =
1=2R(®;¯) ¡ ¯ ¡ c after renegotiations.
If there has been unilateral rejection, partners want to regain the lost 1=2R(®;¯).
But, as this part of the surplus now belongs to the solicitor, he will prevent
any further agreement { and the original payo® remains unchanged.
In sum, the payo® matrix at the authentication stage including possible rene-
gotiations is shown in Table 2. A detailed pay-o® structure is given in the
appendix within the proof of proposition 1.
Based on Table 2 we can start backward induction by analysing Nash equi-
libria of the authentication stage including renegotiations.
For the analysis to follow it is important to recall that messages are capped
at ®¤ and ¯¤. Thus, investments above the e±cient level { may they be real
or just reported { are not supported by subsidies and will not occur as long
as players are rational. Accordingly, for sake of simplicity we will not address
the possibility of overinvestment.
At the authentication stage, validation is a best response to validation as
long as R(®;¯) ¸ R(~ ®; ~ ¯). In addition, in this case rejection is a best
response to rejection if c · 1=2R(®sb;¯sb).11 Thus, if R(®;¯) ¸ R(~ ®; ~ ¯)
11From A's perspective validation is a best response to rejection if both parties have
signi¯cantly underreported, B has chosen a low report and A himself has considerably
14(which means that either no party has overreported or one has over- and
the other su±ciently underreported), there are two Nash equilibria of the
authentication game: (v;v) and (r;r).
In case of bilateral overreporting or high unilateral overreporting (R(~ ®; ~ ¯) >
R(®;¯)), (v;v) is not a Nash equilibrium anymore. However, (r;r) remains
as a Nash equilibrium.
Now we know that (v;v) or (r;r) are the results to be expected from the
authentication stage and we turn to the reporting decision. At this stage
investments have taken place such that ® and ¯ are given. We distinguish
two cases: (1) Both parties have invested e±ciently; (2) at least one party
has chosen underinvestment.
(1) Both have invested e±ciently (® = ®¤ and ¯ = ¯¤):
In that case, overreporting is not a meaningful alternative as reports get cut
at ®¤ and ¯¤. Thus, for all reports R(®;¯) = R(®¤;¯¤) ¸ R(~ ®; ~ ¯) holds
which implies that either mutual validation or mutual rejection result.
Under mutual validation A's payo® is
¼A(®
¤;¯
¤; ~ ®; ~ ¯;v;v) = 1=2R(®
¤;¯
¤) ¡ ®
¤ + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯
which is strictly increasing in ~ ® and therefore takes its maximum at ~ ® = ® =
®¤.
Under mutual rejection A's payo® is
¼A(®
¤;¯




which is independent of ~ ®. The same considerations apply for player B.
Thus, if e±cient investments have taken place, truthful reporting is a weakly
dominant strategy for both players.
(2) At least one player has chosen underinvestment (® · ®¤ and ¯ · ¯¤ and
at least one inequality is strict):
overreported such that 2c ¸ R(~ ®; ~ ¯)+ ~ ¯¡ ~ ®. For B these considerations hold analogously.
Due to our assumptions on c and the production function, these cases can be excluded.
Details are given in the proof of proposition 1.
15In that case there is scope for overreporting for any party that has made
a less-than-optimal investment. Mutual rejection can result after any com-
bination of reports. Therefore, the argument to follow concentrates on the
question of which combinations can be followed by mutual validation.
Yet, the ¯rst result is a negative one. If both parties overreport, mutual
rejection will follow for sure. So, the remaining combinations are truthful
reporting and pairs of under- and overreporting. As will be shown in more
detail in the proof of proposition 1, mutual truthful reporting constitutes
a Nash equilibrium that can be followed by mutual validation for any pair
of investments. These equilibria are stabilized from two directions: If one
party chooses a truthful report, the other one would not raise its revenue
by overreporting as this behaviour would lead for sure to mutual rejection
{ which is for 2c ¸ j¯ ¡ ®j dominated by truthful reporting and mutual
validation. Underreporting is as well not a best response as for the case of
mutual validation a low report would reduce own subsidies and in the case
of mutual rejection payments are not in°uenced by reports.
In addition, there are combinations where one party overreports and the
other one chooses a balancing underreport. Here, \balancing" means that
the combination of reports still allows for mutual validation to follow. To do
so, the condition R(®;¯) ¸ R(~ ®; ~ ¯) needs to hold. Yet, if both parties choose
mutual best responses, the underreporting party will receive exactly the same
payo® under subsequent mutual validation as under mutual rejection.
In sum, at the reporting stage a number of paths could be part of a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium: (1) Truthtelling and mutual validation or mu-
tual rejection; (2) if investments have been ine±ciently low, combinations of
under- and overreporting and mutual validation or mutual rejection. Thus,
independent of the play at the reporting stage, mutual validation or mu-
tual rejection might follow. So, parties might end up with a payo® without
subsidies no matter which reports have been chosen.
If we now turn to the investment stage, this result implies that a course of the
game where both parties choose second-best investments, report truthfully,
16and reject each other's message cannot be excluded. Accordingly, the second-
best solution is on the path of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game
and cannot be excluded by a contracting mechanism.
However, as long as truthful reporting is a best response to truthful report-
ing independent of investment levels, e±cient investments can be part of a
subgame-perfect equilibrium. This latter property depends on the magnitude
of renegotiation costs. Thus, we can show that a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium exists where both parties choose ¯rst-best investments if renegotiation
costs are su±ciently high.
Proposition 1. 1. If renegotiation cost are su±ciently high, that is 2c ¸
®¤¡®sb, the game based on the above third-party contract scenario has
a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which both players choose ¯rst-best
investments, report truthfully, and mutually validate reports.
If the initial contract is costly, this equilibrium is the only forward-
induction-proof equilibrium of the game.
2. If 2c < ®¤ ¡ ®sb, Che and Hausch's (1999) negative result applies and
¯rst-best investments cannot be implemented by a contract in the third-
party scenario.
3. Independent of the contract parameters there is a subgame-perfect equi-
librium that leads to second-best investments.
The proof is given in the appendix of the paper.
The result on uniqueness under forward induction is based on the following
considerations: No contract can rule out shirking behaviour for sure. If one
of both parties wants to choose second-best investments, it can turn this be-
haviour into a part of a Nash-equilibrium strategy by choosing rejection in
the ¯nal stage of the message game. Yet, if a party has no interest in coop-
erative behaviour there is no need to bear the cost of writing a sophisticated
contract whose unique aim is to overcome the underinvestment problem. Put
it di®erently: A party that is willing to incur the cost of contracting sends a
17A=B v r
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¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® + subsidy A
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ + subsidy B
¼A = R ¡ ® ¡ damage to B ¡ d
¼B = ¡¯ + damage to B
r
¼A = ¡® + damage to A
¼B = R ¡ ¯ ¡ damage to A ¡ d
¼A = ¡®
¼B = ¡¯
Table 3: Authentication game under the market scheme before renegotiations
signal that it wants to get a higher payo® from cooperation than it could have
by the second-best result always at hand. Thus, by burning the money for
writing the initial contract, players select the equilibrium that implements
the ¯rst-best outcome.
4.2 Market scheme
The analysis of the market-based contract is analogous to that of the con-
tract under third-party payments. However, as the payo® matrix at the au-
thentication stage di®ers from that under the third-party scheme, backward
induction may take a di®erent path.
The original payo® matrix at the authentication stage (®;¯; ~ ®; ~ ¯ are already
chosen) in the market-based scenario is shown in Table 3. Yet, to start a
backward-inductive analysis we have as before to determine ¯nal payo®s by
checking incentives for renegotiations.
Again, mutual validation is renegotiation proof whereas mutual rejection
leads to renegotiation if c < 1=2R(®sb;¯sb) (see footnote 10 on page 13).
Unilateral rejection deserves a closer look under the market scheme than un-
der the third-party scheme. Here, the proceedings stipulated by the original
contract would have one party leaving the business which induces an overall
loss of d as described on page 10. If partners enter renegotiations, their re-
spective outside options would be the payment under the original contract. If
18A=B v r
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¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® + subsidy A
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ + subsidy B
¼A = R¡®¡damage to B¡1=2d¡c
¼B = ¡¯ +damage to B +1=2d¡c
r
¼A = ¡® + damage to A + 1=2d ¡ c
¼B = R¡¯¡damage to A¡1=2d¡c
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ c
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ ¡ c
Table 4: Authentication game under the market scheme
we again assume symmetric bargaining power, renegotiations would lead to
an equal split of d in addition to parties' initial payo®s. Accordingly, parties
will enter renegotiations as long as c · 1=2d.
Thus, the payo® matrix including renegotiations is shown in Table 4. A
detailed pay-o® structure is given in the appendix within the proof of propo-
sition 2.
Again, we start backward induction by analysing Nash equilibria of these
¯nal payo®s. In the determination of mutual best responses the parameter
values for c (renegotiation cost) and d (continuation cost) are crucial. To
¯nd best responses to rejection and validation we therefore need to enter a
case distinction on c and d.
First, we assume that c = 1=2d as in this case both values cancel out for one
partner after (v;r) and (r;v).
In that case, mutual validation can result as an equilibrium { analogous to
the third-party case { if R(®;¯) ¸ R(~ ®; ~ ¯). Yet, to check if mutual rejection
is an equilibrium, we have to consider the possibility of unilateral rejection
as well.
We know that r is a best response to v if R(®;¯) · R(~ ®; ~ ¯). In that case
unilateral rejection of player A (and correspondingly for player B) constitutes
a Nash equilibrium of the authentication game if in addition for B v is a best
response to r. This latter condition holds if
d · R(®;¯) ¡ R(~ ®; ~ ¯) ¡ (~ ® ¡ ~ ¯):
19Analogous considerations apply to the case where B unilaterally rejects
A's report. In sum, we can state the converse result: (r;r) constitutes
a Nash equilibrium at the authentication stage if R(®;¯) ¸ R(~ ®; ~ ¯) and
d ¸ R(®;¯) ¡ R(~ ®; ~ ¯) ¡ j~ ® ¡ ~ ¯j.
In a backward-induction analysis we have, thus, to consider four possible
Nash-equilibrium outcomes of the authentication stage: (r;r) { which leads
to payo®s that are independent of players' messages { and (v;v), (v;r), (r;v)
whose payo®s all depend on investments as well as messages.
The analysis of those game paths leading to (v;v) and (r;r) is analogous to
that of the third-party scheme as the payo®s from these paths are identical in
both scenarios. Therefore, we will concentrate on the (v;r) and (r;v) cases.
If unilateral rejection constitutes an equilibrium at the authentication stage,
it can happen that truthtelling is not a best response to truthtelling { which
it had been in all subgames of the third-party scheme. In that case a situa-
tion may result where underinvestment and overreporting is a best response
to e±cient investment and truthtelling. Whether such a situation may oc-
cur, depends on details of the revenue function (for details see the proof of






is a su±cient condition to exclude these cases.
As d is a measure for the loss the partner remaining in business has to
accept if the other party leaves, condition (1) implies that this loss has to be
substantial. From an economic perspective the loss of a business partner is
substantial if his contribution to the collaboration is substantial. Therefore,
condition (1) implies that our contract supports ¯rst-best investments only
if there are big gains to cooperation.
In sum, if condition (1) holds, (v;r) and (r;v) can be excluded as Nash
equilibria of the authentication game. In that case the further analysis is
the same as under the third-party scheme. If condition (1) does not hold,
cooperation may break down for a number of production functions. As we
20are interested in stating conditions for successful contracting, we will not
address this case furthermore.
It remains to address the cases c > 1=2d and c < 1=2d. The latter case is
analogous to the case of low renegotiation cost in the third-party scheme,
that is, cheating is cheap and cooperation will break down for sure. The
former case, c > 1=2d, leads to perturbances of a di®erent kind. In this case,
unilateral rejection would not be followed by renegotiations as explained at
the beginning of the section. If renegotiations after unilateral rejection are
too costly, parties would be willing to validate each other's report even if
it includes a slight overreport. Therefore, each party would choose a small
mark-up on its actual investments when reporting. In consequence, the sub-
sidies paid according to the contract are higher than they would be under
truthtelling. Parties account for that when choosing their investment deci-
sion. In equilibrium investments will be smaller than ¯rst-best investments
but higher than second-best investments { the di®erence depending on rene-
gotiation costs. In such a scenario contracting would still improve the value
of cooperation but could not implement the ¯rst-best solution.
In sum, we can state
Proposition 2. 1. If the loss from one partner leaving business is su±-
ciently high, that is d ¸ ®¤¡®sb = ¯¤¡¯sb and the cost of renegotiation
equals 1=2d, a contract based on the market scenario has a subgame-
perfect equilibrium in which both players choose ¯rst-best investments,
report truthfully, and mutually validate reports.
If the initial contract is costly, this equilibrium is the only forward-
induction-proof equilibrium of the game.
2. If either the loss from one partner leaving business or the renegotiation
cost are to small, Che and Hausch's (1999) negative result applies and
¯rst-best investments cannot be implemented by a contract in the market
scenario.
The market-based scenario looks at ¯rst sight more appealing (at least from
21a theoretical perspective) than the third-party scenario as it does not refer to
an active third party. Yet, as the results of proposition 2 show, cooperation
can only be established in a rather narrow range of parameters. So, the
question arises if contracting is really valuable in such an environment. That
is, we have to discuss the admissible ranges of c and d. We will address this
issue in the next section within a comparative analysis of the third-party and
the market-based scheme.
5 Discussion of the assumptions
The analyses described above are based on a number of assumptions: First
of all, they make heavy use of two parameters treated as exogenously given,
namely renegotiation cost and continuation cost. Second, the model assumes
that the collaborating parties can observe each other's input although it is
not observable (or veri¯able) to outside parties. Third, we have assumed that
parties might enter renegotiations at the end of the game but not before. All
three assumptions will be discussed in what follows.
Renegotiation and continuation cost
The positive result obtained in both scenarios depends on renegotiation cost;
in the market-based scenario continuation cost are important as well. Hence,
two issues have to be addressed.
(1) In the third-party scenario we have stated an upper and a lower bound
for renegotiation cost { both of which where essential in the proof of propo-
sition 1. We need to show that the set of admissible parameter values is not
empty. We have stated that renegotiation cost should be smaller or equal
than 1=2R(®sb;¯sb) and greater or equal than 1=2(®¤ ¡ ®sb). Both condi-
tions can hold at the same time if 1=2R(®sb;¯sb) ¸ 1=2(®¤ ¡ ®sb) which
implies that the expected revenue is big compared to investments. Now, the
contract described above is a rather complex construct and, therefore, pre-
sumably expensive. So, parties will only be apt to invest into the contracting
process if the pro¯t at stake is substantial { which ¯ts the economic essence
22of the condition. Yet, this precondition is out o® the sphere of in°uence of
the contracting parties which implies a slight restriction of the proposition's
statement.
(2) In both scenarios we have stated lower bounds for the cost parameters:
In the third-party scenario on renegotiation cost (as mentioned above) and
in the market-based scenario on continuation cost. So, the question arises if
parties can make sure that these costs are su±ciently high. To answer that
question, we have to look at possible sources of each cost parameter.
In the third-party scenario renegotiation cost can be stipulated in the orig-
inal contract. For instance, they could be designed as a fee to the already
involved solicitor that has to be paid if (r;r) had been the outcome at the
authentication stage and collaboration is resumed afterwards { which is ver-
i¯able and can, therefore, not be part of a tacit agreement to circumvent the
fee. As ®¤ as well as ®sb are known in advance, parties can make sure that
this fee is su±ciently high. Thus, this aspect of a successful contract lies in
the sphere of the cooperating parties.
In the market-based scenario continuation cost covers on the one hand as-
pects of the production process and on the other hand the cost of a loss of
reputation as a reliable partner for other potential collaborations. Both of
these aspects are out o® the sphere of both partners. Thus, in the market-
based scenario there is no endogenous way to make sure that continuation
costs are su±ciently high. Accordingly, the possibility to install a successful
collaboration is exogenously determined.
As we have argued before, only those collaborations justify a complex con-
tracting process where both partners are important { which implies that
continuation costs are high. Yet, one problem here could be that neither
the continuation cost nor the loss in reputation can exactly be evaluated in
advance. So, there is uncertainty at the initial stage whether the contract
will be self-enforcing or not.
In addition, proposition 2 stated that renegotiation costs have to be exactly
one half of the continuation costs to support ¯rst-best investments. Thus,
23even if we assume that these costs can be endogenously determined as in the
third-party scheme, the implementation of this condition is much less robust
than that of the third-party case.
In sum, for both scenarios success of the contracting process depends on
exogenous as well as on endogenous parameters. Yet, we argue that the
optimal contract is easier to ¯nd in the third-party scenario than in the pure
market-based scenario. If we account for costs of the inclusion of a third
party (which we have not done explicitly at the message-game stage), we can
combine both scenarios: As long as potential partners are convinced that a
market solution su±ces to establish cooperation { which still includes set-up
costs for the initial contract { they will rely on a pure market- and reputation-
oriented mechanism. If, however, potential partners are uncertain as to the
e®ectiveness of the market or assess the market mechanism di®erently, they
can still resort to the more costly third-party scheme.
In that scenario an external solicitor is involved at two stages (at the set-up
and at the message-game stage). If we transfer elements of the theoretical
model to reality, we can identify correspondents for these two positions where
agents with a legal education might be involved in the process of designing
letters of intent. First, in the design of the initial contract it is helpful to
involve an external agent to document { and maybe raise { the cost of the
contract. As we have seen, making the contract costly is a device to stabilize
cooperation by a forward-induction argument. Second, an outside reliably
neutral party is needed at the authentication stage of the theoretical model.
This fact might explain why real-world ¯rms consult law ¯rms during the
contracting process in addition to their own legal departments.
In sum, both aspects of our model together might add some insight to the
question why a big law industry is involved in designing letters of intent and
why these lawyers are not employees of the ¯rms signing the contract.
Observability
The question might arise how ¯rms get so detailed insight into their partner's
activities. In particular, if we comprise that in reality cooperative projects
24are tainted with considerable uncertainty, it is not at all obvious why ¯rms
should be able to observe each other's actual commitment and investment
into the joint project. We think that this question can be addressed from
two angles.
First, one could ask who would be apt to start a joint project. If partners
know each other well and have already established long-term relations, it can
well be presumed that they have a sound knowledge of each other's activi-
ties. An empirical analysis by BÄ onte (2008) suggests such a connection. The
author shows that ¯rms who are spatially close or have long-term relations
are more prone to start cooperations and are, in addition, more willing to
trust each other. Yet, as we have argued in the paragraph above, a recent
development sees ¯rms that are located far apart, in particular across di®er-
ent jurisdictions, starting cooperative projects. Here, we cannot assume that
there is an a-priori intimate knowledge of each other's corporate structure.
Thus, it is not clear in how far these partners could have mutual knowledge
that is superior to that courts could gain. In that case the second explanation
applies.
Second, if there is no natural way to ensure observability, ¯rms can design
institutions that help to establish observability. Within simpler settings, the
information from the business plan and those facts that are exchanged within
the letter-of-intent system can provide observability. Although the business
plan and the messages exchanged at ex-interim meetings can be checked by
third parties { and are, thus, veri¯able in our de¯nition { these meetings allow
for an exchange of informal messages that satisfy the informational needs of
the project partners but cannot be assessed by outsiders. Another possibility
that establishes a long-term communication is to exchange team members.
So, if one employee of ¯rm A works at ¯rm B and vice versa, both ¯rms gain
a basic knowledge of the other one's activities. Such an exchange on the one
hand allows for unbiased information and on the other hand prevents fraud.
Timing of Renegotiations
As Watson (2007) has shown, timing of renegotiations has a serious impact
25on the structure and results of a contracting process. The author analyzes
the di®erent impacts of ex-interim and ex-post renegotiations on the imple-
mentation of ¯rst-best solutions. If we transfer this analysis to our setting,
we ¯nd that there is one additional point in time where renegotiations could
occur: After investments have taken place and before messages have been
exchanged.
These ex-interim renegotiations could have an e®ect on the implementation of
¯rst-best results in the third-party scenario only. In that scenario the parties
to the original contract could gain by excluding the solicitor from payments
in the case of unfavorable investment decisions. However, in our setting
this option does not change the implementation result. Renegotiations could
only occur to avoid the outcomes (v;r) or (r;v) of the message game which
would induce a payment to the solicitor and, thus, a loss of a rent to the
parties to the original contract. In all other cases the message game results
in division of a rent that has been fully determined by investment decisions.
Renegotiations could cover side payments to prevent play along those two
unfavorable paths. Yet, these outcomes would not result under rational play
of the original game.
In the market-based scenario there is no di®erence between ex-interim and
ex-post renegotiations as the enforcing e®ect of the loss in reputation lies
far ahead from parties' interaction. So, there is no scope for ex-interim
renegotiations.
6 Conclusion
We propose a contractual solution to the hold-up problem if investments are
relation speci¯c, non veri¯able, and have positive cross e®ects on the part-
ner's bene¯t. Based on Maskin and Moore's (1999) implementation result
we have augmented the initial contract by a message game which turns the
originally incomplete contract into a complete one. This additional mecha-
nism provides veri¯able information (acknowledged reports) that allows for
26subsidy payments which help to induce e±cient investments.
Our analysis provides several results that connect Maskin and Moore's ap-
proach with a negative result by Che and Hausch (1999) who show that
without a means to prevent renegotiations any contract in the above setting
is worthless. We have shown that the additional mechanism alone cannot pre-
vent the incentives for underinvestment. However, if parties make use of the
institutions that surround them, they can implement ¯rst-best investments
by enhancing their contract by the above message game.
We have considered two such institutional settings: (1) a scenario that al-
lows for payments to a third party and (2) a scenario where parties use the
information transmission provided by the market surrounding their coopera-
tion, in particular reputation e®ects. Both systems have been known before
as helpful means to overcome problems of shirking in partnerships. Yet,
in former work the payments used have been exogenous to the contracting
problem at hand. Our analysis enriches the literature by a mechanism that
provides an endogenous set of sanctions to enforce the contract. In addition,
we discuss the robustness of the contractual success in supporting ¯rst-best
decisions in both scenarios. We could show that the third-party scheme
supports ¯rst-best decisions more often as it leaves more discretion to the
contracting parties. Put it di®erently, the third-party mechanism could be
used as a contractual means for all those cases where partners do not want
to rely on the market (see the discussion in section 5).
The mechanism we have designed can be seen as a translation of the (real-
world) system of writing letters of intent into theory. In legal practice such
contractual devices are frequently applied. They de¯ne a series of messages
or meetings where partners report on their investment into a joint project.
By use of letters of intent parties are able to exchange veri¯able information
and signal their willingness to continue their relationship. Such stable inter-
nal mechanisms become particularly important in contracting environments
where contractual terms are non-veri¯able or non-enforceable { which is the
case, for instance, in international cooperations where partners lack a joint
27reliable legal system. Our analysis shows which elements of a letter-of-intent
system are important to close this gap by private means.
We have shown that letters of intent themselves contribute to the solution of
the underinvestment problem by turning unveri¯able information into ver-
i¯able one. In addition, the payments to solicitors that have to be made
to write these letters of intent are valuable from a contracting perspective.
For, they are a means to establish cooperation. A party who is willing to
pay for an accomplished contract \burns money" and therefore sends a sig-
nal that it is willing to cooperate in the contractual relationship. Such a
signal is more important the less parties know about each other, the worse
their reputation as a collaborator, or the more severe the underinvestment
problem gets. In all theses cases an expensive signal (the commissioning of
a reliable external solicitor) helps to show own commitment to cooperate.
Thus, as a byproduct of our analysis the law industry might appear in a
better light: The fact that more and more lawyers who are more and more
expensive are needed for writing contracts cannot be explained exclusively
by market power and rent extraction of the law industry (which would be
an obvious explanation). We would rather stress an aspect that is due to
new possibilities in worldwide cooperation resulting from advancements in
information technology. As worldwide communication has become cheap,
¯rms can start cooperations that cannot rely on a proven and tested institu-
tional framework (like long-term relation, a joint legal system, etc.). Thus,
the inclusion of solicitors can be seen as a substitute for these institutions.
In consequence, payments to them are costs of the realization of bene¯cial
projects that would have been infeasible without this device. In sum, they
contribute to an enlargement of the worldwide production set.
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v
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ + 1=2~ ¯ ¡ 1=2~ ®
¼A = 1=2R¡®¡1=2 ~ R+1=2~ ®¡1=2~ ¯
¼B = ¡¯ + 1=2 ~ R + 1=2~ ¯ ¡ 1=2~ ®
r
¼A = ¡® + 1=2 ~ R + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯
¼B = 1=2R¡¯¡1=2 ~ R+1=2~ ¯¡1=2~ ®
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ c
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ ¡ c
Table 5: Extended payo®s under third-party scheme after renegotiation
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
We prove all three claims of the proposition within a single process and start
a backward analysis that takes at ¯rst the payo®s of the authentication stage
into account. The results of this analysis will be used to prune the game tree.
The same procedure will be applied to the message stage which allows for
an analysis of the payo®s at the investment level. From this analysis the two
subgame-perfect equilibria of the game will follow. The proof concludes with
the application of the forward induction argument to exclude the second-best
investment path.
Authentication stage:
We start our analysis with the payo® matrix of the game when renegotiations
are taken into account, that is, we have a detailed look at the payo® matrix
from table 2.
Here, R denotes R(®;¯), that is, the true revenue, and ~ R denotes R(~ ®; ~ ¯),
that is, the revenue that would result from reported investments. This payo®
matrix is based on the third-party scenario explained in section 4.1. Thus,
in case of unilateral rejection, the rejecting party receives a damage payment
but has to waive its part of the revenue which goes to a third party (the
solicitor). The party that remained within business is capable of continuing
the project without a loss.
This subgame from table 5 has at most two Nash equilibria as will be shown
32by a best-response analysis.
1) Player A's best response to B playing r is r if
1=2R ¡ ® ¡ c ¸ 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ 1=2 ~ R + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯
, 1=2 ~ R + 1=2(~ ¯ ¡ ~ ®) ¸ c:
B's best response to A playing r is analogously r if 1=2 ~ R + 1=2(~ ® ¡ ~ ¯) ¸ c.
Thus, for (r;r) being a Nash equilibrium we need
1=2 ~ R + 1=2j~ ¯ ¡ ~ ®j ¸ c: (2)
As we have assumed (see page 13) that c · 1=2R(®sb;¯sb) where ®sb;¯sb
are rational investments without a contract following from @R
@® = @R
@¯ = 2,
condition (2) will hold for all investments and reports above (®sb;¯sb) for the
following reasoning:
Condition (2) can only be hurt if ~ R is low and the di®erence between ~ ¯ and
~ ® is very high. Yet, the most extreme di®erence between reports that can
actually happen is given by ~ ¯ = ¯¤ and ~ ® = ®sb. Due to the assumptions
on ®sb;¯sb and ®¤;¯¤ we know that R(®sb;¯¤) ¸ R(®sb;¯sb) + ¯¤ ¡ ¯sb =
R(®sb;¯sb) + ¯¤ ¡ ®sb. Substituting this inequality into (2) we get









which holds if c · 1=2R(®sb;¯sb). Thus, (r;r) is always a Nash equilibrium
of the considered game.
2) Player A's best response to B playing v is v if
1=2R ¡ ®1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯ ¸ ¡® ¡ 1=2 ~ R + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯
, R ¸ ~ R:
The same condition holds for B. Thus, (v;v) is a Nash equilibrium of the
authentication game if R ¸ ~ R, that is, none of the players has overreported or
one has overreported and the other one has chosen a balancing underreport.
If R < ~ R, r is a best response to v. In that case (r;r) remains as the only
Nash equilibrium of the authentication game.
33In sum, if R < ~ R, (r;r) is the only equilibrium of the authentication game
resulting in payo®s ¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ c and ¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ ¡ c. If R ¸ ~ R,
there is an additional equilibrium (v;v) resulting in payo®s ¼A = 1=2R¡®+
1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯ and ¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ + 1=2~ ¯ ¡ 1=2~ ®.
Message stage:
We now look for Nash equilibria of the message game, that is, when invest-
ments have already been chosen. As payo®s are independent of the messages
when (r;r) will be played in the continuation of the game, all messages are
mutual best responses within this part of the game tree. Therefore, we con-
centrate at ¯rst on those combinations of messages where (v;v) can follow
in the continuation of the game. To make (v;v) a possible equilibrium of
the authentication game, R ¸ ~ R needs to hold. For that we distinguish two
cases: Mutual truthful reporting and onesided overreporting.
1) Assume that B has chosen a truthful message, that is, ~ ¯ = ¯.
In that case A's payo® is strictly increasing in ~ ® if (v;v) is the outcome of the
authentication game. This outcome can only occur if ~ ® · ® as this would
imply R(~ ®; ~ ¯) · R(®;¯). Thus, A's best response to a truthful report of B
is a truthful report if A prefers the outcome after (v;v) to the outcome after
(r;r), that is, if
1=2R ¡ ® + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯ ¸ 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ c
, 2c ¸ ~ ¯ ¡ ~ ®:
Analogous considerations apply for B such that mutual truthful reporting
is an equilibrium of the message game if 2c ¸ j~ ¯ ¡ ~ ®j. Again, the biggest
possible di®erence between reports { and under the assumption of truthtelling
between actual investments { is given by a combination ~ ¯ = ¯¤ and ~ ® = ®sb
or vice versa. As both partners are symmetric, we know that ¯¤ = ®¤ and
¯sb = ®sb.






34If condition (3) does not hold, two cases apply: (i) If A has chosen an inef-
¯ciently small investment, he prefers to overreport his investment to secure
that (r;r) will result in the continuation of the game. Thus, overreporting is
a best response to truthful reporting. In that case B has to use the consid-
erations that will be presented in case 2) to follow. With condition (3) being
invalid we will see that B will prefer truthful or overreporting in that case.
(ii) If A has chosen an e±cient investment, there is no scope for overreport-
ing as reports are bounded from above by ®¤. So, truthtelling is the best
response to truthtelling in this case. If B has chosen an e±cient investment
as well, mutual truthtelling will result. Yet, if B has invested ine±ciently
low, his best response with condition (3) being invalid will be overreporting
which again leads to case 2) below.
2) Assume that B has chosen an overreport, that is, ~ ¯ > ¯.
As reports are bounded from above by ¯¤ this case can only occur after B
has chosen an ine±ciently low investment. In his decision on a best response
A has to consider two possibilities: He can choose a message ~ ®1 that is close
to or even bigger than ®. In that case R(~ ®1; ~ ¯) > R(®;¯) and (r;r) results
for sure in the continuation of the game. Or he can choose an underreport
~ ®2 such that R(~ ®2; ~ ¯) · R(®;¯) in which case (v;v) can follow in the con-
tinuation of the game. As payo®s after (v;v) are increasing for A in ~ ®2
as long as R(~ ®2; ~ ¯) · R(®;¯) holds, A will choose a report ~ ®2 such that
R(~ ®2; ~ ¯)=R(®;¯).
A prefers a message ~ ®2 to a message ~ ®1 if
1=2R ¡ ® + 1=2~ ®2 ¡ 1=2~ ¯ ¸ 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ c
which { due to condition (3) { holds for any possible combination of ~ ®2; ~ ¯.
Thus, if B chooses an overreport, A's best response will be to choose a
balancing underreport.
If B anticipates A's best response to his overreport, he will choose his message
either such that ~ ®2 = ®sb is the balancing underreport or if that is infeasible
such that ~ ¯ = ¯¤. For, B's payo® if (v;v) will be played in the continuation
of the game is increasing in his message and therefore he will choose an
35overreport that maximizes his payo® which is a message that is not above
the threshold ~ ¯ = ¯¤ and can just be balanced by A. Thus, there is a second
equilibrium where B overreports and A chooses a signi¯cant underreport.
Analogous considerations apply to the case that A has invested ine±ciently
low and has chosen an overreport.
In sum, we can state that after mutual e±cient investments { which implies
that case 2) cannot occur { mutual truthtelling is the only message choice
that can be part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Yet, if at least
one party has invested ine±ciently low and condition (3) holds, there are
additional equilibria where one party overreports and thus exploits the other
party. If both parties have chosen underinvestment, there are two asymmetric
Nash equilibria as both parties could be the overreporting player. But { and
this aspect is important for the claim of proposition 1 { mutual truthtelling
remains part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, no matter how di®erent
reports have been.
If condition (3) does not hold, mutual truthtelling will only occur after mutual
e±cient investments (due to a lack of alternatives). After one- or double-
sided underinvestment overreporting will happen such that (r;r) is the only
possible outcome of the authentication game.
Investment stage:
Now we have determined the path through the game tree that would follow
each possible combination of investment decisions such that we can turn to
the investment stage. We show that both e±cient and second-best invest-
ments can be part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.
If player A expects that player B will report truthfully after the investment
stage, his best response is truthful reporting as well. Mutual truthfull re-
porting can be followed by mutual validation (if 2c ¸ ®¤ ¡ ®sb) as well as
mutual rejection. Therefore, we have to distinguish two pathes through the
remainder of the game tree.
1) If truthful reporting and mutual rejection will follow, player A's payo®
36function at the investment stage from the pruned game tree is
¼A = 1=2R(®;¯) ¡ ® ¡ c:
This function is maximised at @R
@®j(®;¯) = 2 which de¯nes player A's best
response to an investment level ¯ of B. As an analogous argument holds
for B which leads to @R
@¯j(®;¯) = 2, we know that second-best investments are
a part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if players expect (r;r) at the
authentication stage. This argument proves claim 3 of the proposition.
2) If 2c ¸ ®¤ ¡ ®sb, mutual validation is also a Nash equilibrium of the
authentication stage. In that case truthful reporting implies that A's payo®
function at the investment stage of the pruned game tree is
¼A = 1=2R(®;¯) ¡ ® + 1=2® ¡ 1=2¯:
This function is maximised at @R
@®j(®;¯) = 1 which de¯nes player A's best
response to an investment level ¯ of B. As again an analogous argument
holds for B which leads to @R
@¯j(®;¯) = 1, we know that ¯rst-best investments
are a part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if players expect (v;v) at
the authentication stage. This argument proves claim 1 of the proposition.
If 2c < ®¤¡®sb, there is no mutual-validation equilibrium at the authentica-
tion stage. Thus, (r;r) is the only play to be expected which leaves second-
best investments as the only subgame-perfect-equilibrium investments. This
is exactly Che and Hausch's result as stated in claim 2 of the proposition.
¤
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof is analogous to that of proposition 1 as long as we can exclude
(r;v) and (v;r) as equilibrium outcomes of the authentication stage. These
cases provide the only di®erences between both scenarios. Thus, we have
to check, when v and r are mutual best responses. To analyse these cases,
we take at a look at a detailed payo® matrix that covers the possibility of
renegotiations as given in Table 6:
37A=B v r
v
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ + 1=2~ ¯ ¡ 1=2~ ®
¼A = R ¡ ® ¡ 1=2 ~ R ¡ 1=2~ ¯ + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2d ¡ c
¼B = ¡¯ + 1=2 ~ R + 1=2~ ¯ ¡ 1=2~ ® + 1=2d ¡ c
r
¼A = ¡® + 1=2 ~ R + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯ + 1=2d ¡ c
¼B = R ¡ ¯ ¡ 1=2 ~ R ¡ 1=2~ ® + 1=2~ ¯ ¡ 1=2d ¡ c
¼A = 1=2R ¡ ® ¡ c
¼B = 1=2R ¡ ¯ ¡ c
Table 6: Extended payo®s under market scheme after renegotiation
Here, as before, ~ R means R(~ ®; ~ ¯).
Now, from A's perspective r is a best response to v if
1=2R ¡ ® + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯ · ¡® + 1=2 ~ R + 1=2~ ® ¡ 1=2~ ¯ + 1=2d ¡ c (4)
, 1=2R · 1=2 ~ R + 1=2d ¡ c:
As we have assumed that c = 1=2d, condition (4) can only hold if there had
been overreporting.
If (r;v) is to be a Nash equilibrium, we need, in addition, that from B's
perspective v is a best response to r which holds true if
R ¡ ¯ ¡ 1=2 ~ R ¡ 1=2~ ® + 1=2~ ¯ ¡ 1=2d ¡ c ¸ 1=2R ¡ ¯ ¡ c (5)
, ~ ¯ ¡ ~ ® ¡ d ¸ ~ R ¡ R:
Thus, if condition (5) holds, depends on the size of d as well as on true and
reported investments. The existence, of (r;v) as an equilibrium corrupts the
implementation of ¯rst-best investments if it supports an equilibrium where
one party chooses underinvestment and overreporting and this combination
leads to a payo® for the underinvesting party that is higher than that from
¯rst-best investments, truthtelling and mutual validation. To analyse that
case, assume that B has invested e±ciently and reported truthfully, while A
has chosen ®sb as investment and reported ~ ® = ®sb + ".












sb + ") ¡ 1=2¯
¤ + 1=2d ¡ c
, 2" ¸
R(®¤;¯¤) ¡ R(®sb + ";¯¤)
®¤ ¡ (®sb + ")
:
Whether this latter condition holds for at least one value of " depends on
the revenue function and cannot be excluded by general considerations. Yet,
if it holds, e±cient investments, truthtelling, and mutual validation do not
constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium anymore. Therefore, to exclude
this possibility, we have to make sure, that condition (5) does not hold for
all possible combinations of investment.
As has been argued before, the biggest distance that might arise between
investment levels is ®¤ ¡ ®sb = ¯¤ ¡ ¯sb. If investment levels have been ®sb
and ¯¤ and reports have been ~ ® = ®sb + " and ~ ¯ = ¯¤, condition (5) reads
¯¤ ¡ ®sb
®sb + " ¡ ®sb+
®sb ¡ (®sb + ")
®sb + " ¡ ®sb ¡
d
®sb + " ¡ ®sb ¸
R(®sb + ";¯¤) ¡ R(®sb;¯¤)
®sb + " ¡ ®sb
which can never hold true independent of " if d ¸ ¯¤ ¡ ®sb = ®¤ ¡ ®sb.
Analogous considerations apply for the exclusion of (v;r). Thus, we have
found a su±cient condition to stabilize e±cient investments in the market-
based scenario independent of the functional form of the revenue.
¤
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